Spontaneous Order
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portes grátis
Spontaneous Order
How Norms, Institutions, and Innovations Emerge from the Bottom Up
Young, H. Peyton
Oxford University Press
10/2024
400
Dura
9780198892908
15 a 20 dias
Descrição não disponível.
Part I: The Evolution of Norms and Institutions
1: Spontaneous Order
Preface to Chapter 2: Evolutionary Dynamics with Persistent Perturbations
2: The Evolution of Conventions
Preface to Chapter 3: The Spontaneous Emergence of Bargaining Norms
3: An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining
Preface to Chapter 4: Who Sets the Rules of the Game?
4: Conventional Contracts
Preface to Chapter 5: The Role of Custom in Setting Commissions, Fees, and Shares
5: Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture
Part II: Learning
Preface to Chapters 6-8: Learning to Play Without Knowing the Game
6: On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents
7: Learning by Trial and Error
8: Learning in a Black Box
Preface to Chapters 9-10: Spontaneous Order by Design
9: Payoff-Based Dynamics in Multi-Player Weakly Acyclic Games
10: Achieving Pareto-Optimality Through Distributed Learning
Part III: The Diffusion of Innovations
Preface to Chapters 11-13: How Do New Ways of Doing Things Become Generally Accepted?
11: Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning
12: The Dynamics of Social Innovation
13: The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks
1: Spontaneous Order
Preface to Chapter 2: Evolutionary Dynamics with Persistent Perturbations
2: The Evolution of Conventions
Preface to Chapter 3: The Spontaneous Emergence of Bargaining Norms
3: An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining
Preface to Chapter 4: Who Sets the Rules of the Game?
4: Conventional Contracts
Preface to Chapter 5: The Role of Custom in Setting Commissions, Fees, and Shares
5: Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture
Part II: Learning
Preface to Chapters 6-8: Learning to Play Without Knowing the Game
6: On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents
7: Learning by Trial and Error
8: Learning in a Black Box
Preface to Chapters 9-10: Spontaneous Order by Design
9: Payoff-Based Dynamics in Multi-Player Weakly Acyclic Games
10: Achieving Pareto-Optimality Through Distributed Learning
Part III: The Diffusion of Innovations
Preface to Chapters 11-13: How Do New Ways of Doing Things Become Generally Accepted?
11: Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning
12: The Dynamics of Social Innovation
13: The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
Part I: The Evolution of Norms and Institutions
1: Spontaneous Order
Preface to Chapter 2: Evolutionary Dynamics with Persistent Perturbations
2: The Evolution of Conventions
Preface to Chapter 3: The Spontaneous Emergence of Bargaining Norms
3: An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining
Preface to Chapter 4: Who Sets the Rules of the Game?
4: Conventional Contracts
Preface to Chapter 5: The Role of Custom in Setting Commissions, Fees, and Shares
5: Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture
Part II: Learning
Preface to Chapters 6-8: Learning to Play Without Knowing the Game
6: On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents
7: Learning by Trial and Error
8: Learning in a Black Box
Preface to Chapters 9-10: Spontaneous Order by Design
9: Payoff-Based Dynamics in Multi-Player Weakly Acyclic Games
10: Achieving Pareto-Optimality Through Distributed Learning
Part III: The Diffusion of Innovations
Preface to Chapters 11-13: How Do New Ways of Doing Things Become Generally Accepted?
11: Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning
12: The Dynamics of Social Innovation
13: The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks
1: Spontaneous Order
Preface to Chapter 2: Evolutionary Dynamics with Persistent Perturbations
2: The Evolution of Conventions
Preface to Chapter 3: The Spontaneous Emergence of Bargaining Norms
3: An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining
Preface to Chapter 4: Who Sets the Rules of the Game?
4: Conventional Contracts
Preface to Chapter 5: The Role of Custom in Setting Commissions, Fees, and Shares
5: Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture
Part II: Learning
Preface to Chapters 6-8: Learning to Play Without Knowing the Game
6: On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents
7: Learning by Trial and Error
8: Learning in a Black Box
Preface to Chapters 9-10: Spontaneous Order by Design
9: Payoff-Based Dynamics in Multi-Player Weakly Acyclic Games
10: Achieving Pareto-Optimality Through Distributed Learning
Part III: The Diffusion of Innovations
Preface to Chapters 11-13: How Do New Ways of Doing Things Become Generally Accepted?
11: Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning
12: The Dynamics of Social Innovation
13: The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
