Who Should We Be Online?
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Who Should We Be Online?
A Social Epistemology for the Internet
Frost-Arnold, Karen
Oxford University Press Inc
02/2023
288
Dura
Inglês
9780190089184
15 a 20 dias
Descrição não disponível.
Acknowledgments
Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Frameworks for social epistemology of the internet
1.1. The situated knowledge thesis
1.2. Feminist accounts of objectivity
1.3. Veritistic systems-oriented social epistemology
1.4. Epistemologies of ignorance
1.5. Virtue epistemology
1.6. Epistemic injustice
2. Chapter summaries
Chapter 2: Moderators
1. What is online content moderation?
2. Varieties of moderation and censorship debates
3. The epistemic challenges of moderation
4. The virtues of moderators
5. Constraints on moderators
6. Commercial content moderation, epistemic exploitation, and epistemic dumping
7. Algorithms to the rescue?
Chapter 3: Imposters & Tricksters
1. Objectivity and truth
1.1. Objectivity and truth in feminist and veritistic epistemology
1.2. Objectivity, truth, and trust
2. Imposters: Undermining objectivity and truth
3. The need for trustworthiness
3.1. Trust and authenticity
3.2. Practical wisdom and trustworthiness
4. Tricksters: Resisting oppression
4.1. The epistemic benefits of betrayal
4.2. Internet tricksters
4.3. Changing epistemic landscapes and trickery
4.4. Who should we be online?
Chapter 4: Fakers
1. What is fake news?
2. Causes of the fake news problem
2.1. Cognitive/psychological
2.2. Technological affordances/design features
2.3. Social causes
3. The epistemic damage of fake news
3.1. Fake news and false belief
3.2. Fake news and distrust
4. Fake news and white ignorance
5. Fake news, objectivity, and neutrality
6. Conclusion
Chapter 5: Lurkers
1. The internet as a medium for unlearning ignorance
2. What is lurking?
3. The epistemic benefits of lurking
4. Epistemic limitations of lurking
5. Harmful modes of interaction: Ontological expansiveness
6. A virtue epistemology for lurking and online engagement
6.1. Virtues relevant to lurking and engagement
6.2. The importance of practical wisdom
7. Applying the virtue epistemology of lurking
8. Objections and replies
Chapter 6: Conclusion
Appendix: Internet Research Ethics for Philosophers: Privacy, Positionality, and Power
1. Purpose of this appendix
2. Respecting privacy
2.1. Complications for the 'public data' presumption
2.2. Alternatives to simply quoting material one can access online
3. Protecting the researcher in an environment of online harassment
4. Avoiding epistemic appropriation
5. Cultivating a
Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Frameworks for social epistemology of the internet
1.1. The situated knowledge thesis
1.2. Feminist accounts of objectivity
1.3. Veritistic systems-oriented social epistemology
1.4. Epistemologies of ignorance
1.5. Virtue epistemology
1.6. Epistemic injustice
2. Chapter summaries
Chapter 2: Moderators
1. What is online content moderation?
2. Varieties of moderation and censorship debates
3. The epistemic challenges of moderation
4. The virtues of moderators
5. Constraints on moderators
6. Commercial content moderation, epistemic exploitation, and epistemic dumping
7. Algorithms to the rescue?
Chapter 3: Imposters & Tricksters
1. Objectivity and truth
1.1. Objectivity and truth in feminist and veritistic epistemology
1.2. Objectivity, truth, and trust
2. Imposters: Undermining objectivity and truth
3. The need for trustworthiness
3.1. Trust and authenticity
3.2. Practical wisdom and trustworthiness
4. Tricksters: Resisting oppression
4.1. The epistemic benefits of betrayal
4.2. Internet tricksters
4.3. Changing epistemic landscapes and trickery
4.4. Who should we be online?
Chapter 4: Fakers
1. What is fake news?
2. Causes of the fake news problem
2.1. Cognitive/psychological
2.2. Technological affordances/design features
2.3. Social causes
3. The epistemic damage of fake news
3.1. Fake news and false belief
3.2. Fake news and distrust
4. Fake news and white ignorance
5. Fake news, objectivity, and neutrality
6. Conclusion
Chapter 5: Lurkers
1. The internet as a medium for unlearning ignorance
2. What is lurking?
3. The epistemic benefits of lurking
4. Epistemic limitations of lurking
5. Harmful modes of interaction: Ontological expansiveness
6. A virtue epistemology for lurking and online engagement
6.1. Virtues relevant to lurking and engagement
6.2. The importance of practical wisdom
7. Applying the virtue epistemology of lurking
8. Objections and replies
Chapter 6: Conclusion
Appendix: Internet Research Ethics for Philosophers: Privacy, Positionality, and Power
1. Purpose of this appendix
2. Respecting privacy
2.1. Complications for the 'public data' presumption
2.2. Alternatives to simply quoting material one can access online
3. Protecting the researcher in an environment of online harassment
4. Avoiding epistemic appropriation
5. Cultivating a
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
Acknowledgments
Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Frameworks for social epistemology of the internet
1.1. The situated knowledge thesis
1.2. Feminist accounts of objectivity
1.3. Veritistic systems-oriented social epistemology
1.4. Epistemologies of ignorance
1.5. Virtue epistemology
1.6. Epistemic injustice
2. Chapter summaries
Chapter 2: Moderators
1. What is online content moderation?
2. Varieties of moderation and censorship debates
3. The epistemic challenges of moderation
4. The virtues of moderators
5. Constraints on moderators
6. Commercial content moderation, epistemic exploitation, and epistemic dumping
7. Algorithms to the rescue?
Chapter 3: Imposters & Tricksters
1. Objectivity and truth
1.1. Objectivity and truth in feminist and veritistic epistemology
1.2. Objectivity, truth, and trust
2. Imposters: Undermining objectivity and truth
3. The need for trustworthiness
3.1. Trust and authenticity
3.2. Practical wisdom and trustworthiness
4. Tricksters: Resisting oppression
4.1. The epistemic benefits of betrayal
4.2. Internet tricksters
4.3. Changing epistemic landscapes and trickery
4.4. Who should we be online?
Chapter 4: Fakers
1. What is fake news?
2. Causes of the fake news problem
2.1. Cognitive/psychological
2.2. Technological affordances/design features
2.3. Social causes
3. The epistemic damage of fake news
3.1. Fake news and false belief
3.2. Fake news and distrust
4. Fake news and white ignorance
5. Fake news, objectivity, and neutrality
6. Conclusion
Chapter 5: Lurkers
1. The internet as a medium for unlearning ignorance
2. What is lurking?
3. The epistemic benefits of lurking
4. Epistemic limitations of lurking
5. Harmful modes of interaction: Ontological expansiveness
6. A virtue epistemology for lurking and online engagement
6.1. Virtues relevant to lurking and engagement
6.2. The importance of practical wisdom
7. Applying the virtue epistemology of lurking
8. Objections and replies
Chapter 6: Conclusion
Appendix: Internet Research Ethics for Philosophers: Privacy, Positionality, and Power
1. Purpose of this appendix
2. Respecting privacy
2.1. Complications for the 'public data' presumption
2.2. Alternatives to simply quoting material one can access online
3. Protecting the researcher in an environment of online harassment
4. Avoiding epistemic appropriation
5. Cultivating a
Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Frameworks for social epistemology of the internet
1.1. The situated knowledge thesis
1.2. Feminist accounts of objectivity
1.3. Veritistic systems-oriented social epistemology
1.4. Epistemologies of ignorance
1.5. Virtue epistemology
1.6. Epistemic injustice
2. Chapter summaries
Chapter 2: Moderators
1. What is online content moderation?
2. Varieties of moderation and censorship debates
3. The epistemic challenges of moderation
4. The virtues of moderators
5. Constraints on moderators
6. Commercial content moderation, epistemic exploitation, and epistemic dumping
7. Algorithms to the rescue?
Chapter 3: Imposters & Tricksters
1. Objectivity and truth
1.1. Objectivity and truth in feminist and veritistic epistemology
1.2. Objectivity, truth, and trust
2. Imposters: Undermining objectivity and truth
3. The need for trustworthiness
3.1. Trust and authenticity
3.2. Practical wisdom and trustworthiness
4. Tricksters: Resisting oppression
4.1. The epistemic benefits of betrayal
4.2. Internet tricksters
4.3. Changing epistemic landscapes and trickery
4.4. Who should we be online?
Chapter 4: Fakers
1. What is fake news?
2. Causes of the fake news problem
2.1. Cognitive/psychological
2.2. Technological affordances/design features
2.3. Social causes
3. The epistemic damage of fake news
3.1. Fake news and false belief
3.2. Fake news and distrust
4. Fake news and white ignorance
5. Fake news, objectivity, and neutrality
6. Conclusion
Chapter 5: Lurkers
1. The internet as a medium for unlearning ignorance
2. What is lurking?
3. The epistemic benefits of lurking
4. Epistemic limitations of lurking
5. Harmful modes of interaction: Ontological expansiveness
6. A virtue epistemology for lurking and online engagement
6.1. Virtues relevant to lurking and engagement
6.2. The importance of practical wisdom
7. Applying the virtue epistemology of lurking
8. Objections and replies
Chapter 6: Conclusion
Appendix: Internet Research Ethics for Philosophers: Privacy, Positionality, and Power
1. Purpose of this appendix
2. Respecting privacy
2.1. Complications for the 'public data' presumption
2.2. Alternatives to simply quoting material one can access online
3. Protecting the researcher in an environment of online harassment
4. Avoiding epistemic appropriation
5. Cultivating a
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
