Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15
Shafer-Landau, Russ
Oxford University Press
07/2020
368
Mole
Inglês
9780198859529
15 a 20 dias
440
2: M. Coetsee: The Phenomenal Appreciation of Reasons (Or: How not to be a Psychopath)
3: Daniel Wodak: Who's on First?
4: Paulina Sliwa: Excuse Without Exculpation: The Case of Moral Ignorance
5: N.G. Laskowski: Resisting Reductive Realism
6: Joshua Blanchard: Moral Realism and Philosophical Angst
7: Preston Werner: Getting a Moral Thing into a Thought: Metasemantics for Non-Naturalists
8: Daniel Fogal and Olle Risberg: The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations
9: Selim Berker: Quasi-Dependence
10: Michelle M. Dyke: Group Agency Meets Metaethics: How to Craft a More Compelling Form of Normative Relativism
11: Connie S. Rosati: Welfare and Rational Fit
12: Berislav Maru%si'c: Accommodation to Injustice
13: Matt Lutz: The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology
14: Daniel Z. Korman and Dustin Locke: Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments
2: M. Coetsee: The Phenomenal Appreciation of Reasons (Or: How not to be a Psychopath)
3: Daniel Wodak: Who's on First?
4: Paulina Sliwa: Excuse Without Exculpation: The Case of Moral Ignorance
5: N.G. Laskowski: Resisting Reductive Realism
6: Joshua Blanchard: Moral Realism and Philosophical Angst
7: Preston Werner: Getting a Moral Thing into a Thought: Metasemantics for Non-Naturalists
8: Daniel Fogal and Olle Risberg: The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations
9: Selim Berker: Quasi-Dependence
10: Michelle M. Dyke: Group Agency Meets Metaethics: How to Craft a More Compelling Form of Normative Relativism
11: Connie S. Rosati: Welfare and Rational Fit
12: Berislav Maru%si'c: Accommodation to Injustice
13: Matt Lutz: The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology
14: Daniel Z. Korman and Dustin Locke: Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments